Cryptocurrency Competition and the U.S. Monetary System by Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative
6-21-2018
Cryptocurrency Competition and the U.S.
Monetary System
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde
University of Pennsylvania, jesusfv@econ.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, and the Public
Policy Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/55
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, "Cryptocurrency Competition and the U.S. Monetary System" (2018). Penn Wharton Public Policy
Initiative. 55.
https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/55
Cryptocurrency Competition and the U.S. Monetary System
Summary
Advocates of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin believe that having currency competition will help achieve the
economic objective of price stability. This Issue Brief summarizes research that explores whether competition
among privately issued fiat currencies can actually produce price stability. The research finds that in most
cases, a system of private monies does not deliver price stability. And even when it does, it always is subject to
self-fulfilling inflationary episodes, and it supplies a suboptimal amount of money. Although there is no
economic reason to curb the use of cryptocurrencies at the moment, it is important to review key regulatory
issues that policymakers need to consider now, before the use of cryptocurrencies becomes even more
widespread.
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Cryptocurrency Competition  
and the U.S. Monetary System
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, PhD
The sudden appearance of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, and other cryptocurrencies1 
has triggered a wave of interest in privately issued monies.
Today, any person with internet access can use a bewil-
dering array of cryptocurrencies as means of exchange. 
Nearly everyone has heard about Bitcoin, whose 
market capitalization (as of May 28, 2018) exceeds 
$123 billion—an amount greater than the market 
capitalization of eight of the 30 companies in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average.2 But 21 other cryptocurren-
cies already have market capitalizations over $1 billion, 
while another 109 have between $100 and $999.99 
million. Just seven months earlier, only 12 cryptocur-
rencies had market capitalizations over $1 billion 
and another 49 between $100 and $999.99 million.3 
These are astonishing increases. While it is true that 
cryptocurrencies represent only a trivial fraction of all 
payments in the world economy, it is not inconceivable 
that their use may continue to exponentially increase 
over the next few years and even become widespread 
in emerging economies with dysfunctional government 
monies.
Nowadays it is straightforward to create a crypto-
currency. Thanks to fascinating advances in cryptogra-
phy and computer science, cryptocurrencies solve the 
traditional monetary problems of over-issuing, double-
spending (i.e., the holder of the currency should not be 
able to spend the same token twice), and counterfeit-
ing.4 And cryptocurrencies are markedly different from 
SUMMARY
• Many monetary reformers have welcomed the rise of crypto-
currencies such as Bitcoin, in part because they believe that 
having currency competition will help achieve the economic 
objective of price stability.
• This Issue Brief summarizes research that explores whether 
competition among privately issued fiat currencies can actually 
produce price stability. The research finds that in most cases, 
a system of private monies does not deliver price stability. And 
even when it does, it always is subject to self-fulfilling inflation-
ary episodes, and it supplies a suboptimal amount of money.
• Even in the best-case scenario, a purely private monetary 
system fails to provide the socially optimum quantity of money.
• Nevertheless, the threat of competition from private mon-
ies has at least one salutary effect: it imposes some market 
discipline on any government involved in issuing currency. A 
central bank needs to provide sufficiently “good” money, or 
individuals can and will switch to using Bitcoin, Ethereum, or 
some other cryptocurrency.
• Although there is no economic reason to curb the use of crypto-
currencies at the moment, the Issue Brief concludes by posing 
some of the key regulatory issues that policymakers need to 
consider now, before the use of cryptocurrencies becomes 
even more widespread.
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the notes issued by financial institu-
tions during the times of free banking 
for three reasons.5 First, most crypto-
currencies are fully fiduciary, whereas 
notes in the free banking era usually 
represented claims against deposits in 
gold or other assets. Second, cryp-
tocurrencies are not directly related 
to credit but are issued by computer 
networks according to some pre-deter-
mined criteria, such as a “proof-of-
work” (i.e., solving a complex math-
ematical problem or validating other 
cryptocurrency transactions). Third, 
cryptocurrencies like Ethereum can 
also work as a sophisticated automatic 
escrow account. It is effortless to add 
certain conditions for payment to the 
code that controls the cryptocurrency.6 
Over the past several years, 
monetary reformers such as Sen. 
Rand Paul have welcomed the rise 
of cryptocurrencies and pointed to 
currency competition as a possible key 
to achieving the economic objective 
of price stability. In this scenario, as 
different issuers compete to make their 
currency dominant, they are incentiv-
ized to perfect the administration of 
their currency and reduce inefficien-
cies so as to maintain their currency’s 
stable value.7 But can competition 
among privately issued fiat currencies 
work? And to take the experiment a 
step further: is the scenario of a purely 
private monetary system feasible? 
That is the question I explore in my 
research, and it leads to an interesting 
follow-up question for government 
policymakers. Specifically, can private 
monies and a government-issued 
money coexist? Other, more norma-
tive questions can certainly be asked as 
well. For instance, how should govern-
ments react to private monies? Should 
governments prevent the circulation of 
private monies? Should governments 
treat private monies as currencies or as 
any other regular property? Should the 
private monies be taxed?
In my research, I build a model of 
competition among privately issued 
fiduciary currencies.8 Returning to the 
first question about private currency 
competition, I find that, in most cases, 
a system of private monies will not 
deliver price stability and, even when 
it does, it will always be subject to self-
fulfilling inflationary episodes, and it 
will supply a suboptimal amount of 
money. Currency competition works 
only sometimes and partially, and it 
may even be a socially wasteful activity. 
In this Issue Brief, I will explore these 
findings a bit more and discuss how 
the advent of cryptocurrencies and 
their associated technology may affect 
the U.S. monetary system.
 1  Cryptocurrencies are digital currencies that exist indepen-
dently of a central bank by using encryption techniques to 
issue new units, record transactions, and combat fraud. 
They are, in that sense, different from electronic monies 
issued by governments.
 2  Market capitalization is the price per unit times the circulat-
ing supply. Updated cryptocurrency market capitalization 
figures are available at https://coinmarketcap.com.
 3  Ibid.
 4  For details, see Narayanan, A., J. Bonneau, E. Felten, A. 
Miller, and S. Goldfeder (2016). Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency 
Technologies. Princeton University Press. 
 5  For details, see Dowd, K. (1992). The Experience of Free 
Banking. Routledge.
 6  For example: “Peter will pay Mary 10 Ethereum if, tomor-
row at noon, the weather in Philadelphia according to 
weatherunderground.com is over 80 degrees.” Once that 
code is in place, the verification of the specified conditions 
and the payment—if the conditions are satisfied—can be 
automatically implemented.
 7  Wendy Milling, “Private Currency Competition Is the Mon-
etary Answer,” Forbes, August 23, 2012.
 8  The primary source for this Issue Brief is Fernández-
Villaverde, J. and D. Sanches (2016). “Can Currency 
Competition Work?” CEPR Discussion Paper 11095. The 
model developed here extends the environment introduced 
in Lagos, R., and R. Wright (2005). “A unified framework for 
monetary theory and policy analysis,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 113(3), 463–484. 
 9  See Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (1983). “Speculative 
hyperinflations in maximizing models: Can we rule them 
out?” Journal of Political Economy, 91(4), 675–87; and 
Lagos, R., and R. Wright (2003). “Dynamics, cycles, and 
NOTES
TABLE 1  CRYPTOCURRENCIES BY MARKET CAPITALIZATION (>$3 BILLION AS 
OF MAY 28, 2018)
 Rank Cryptocurrency Market Cap Established
 1 Bitcoin $123,000,000,000  2009
 2 Ethereum $53,200,000,000  2013
 3 Ripple $22,900,000,000  2012
 4 Bitcoin Cash $16,000,000,000  2017
 5 EOS $10,700,000,000  2017
 6 Litecoin $6,500,000,000  2011
 7 Stellar $4,900,000,000  2014
 8 Cardano $4,700,000,000  2017
 9 TRON $4,300,000,000  2017
 10 IOTA $3,900,000,000  2015
 11 NEO $3,200,000,000  2014
Source: https://coinmarketcap.com
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CAN CURRENCY 
COMPETITION WORK?
In my analysis, a monetary equilib-
rium with private monies will not 
generally deliver price stability. When 
a profit-maximizing entrepreneur 
issues money, she will try to maximize 
the real value of seigniorage (i.e., the 
difference between the value of money 
and the cost to produce and distrib-
ute it). The conjecture that a system 
of private monies competing among 
themselves would provide a stable 
means of exchange is, in general, 
wrong. When an automaton issues 
money, there is no particular reason 
why the quantity of money issued 
will be compatible with price stabil-
ity, except by coincidence. Bitcoin, 
for instance, has already decided how 
many new units of currency will be 
issued in 2022 even though nobody 
knows what the demand for the cur-
rency will be in that year. 
Furthermore, even when the 
cost function of minting money is 
such that there is equilibrium with 
price stability, there is a continuum 
of equilibrium trajectories where the 
value of private monies monotonically 
decreases and converges to zero. Such 
self-fulfilling inflationary episodes, 
observable in economies with gov-
ernment-issued money and a money-
growth rule, are not, as it turns out, an 
exclusive feature of public monies.9 
Self-fulfilling inflationary episodes 
are, instead, the consequence of using 
intrinsically useless tokens—even if 
those tokens are electronic and issued 
by private, profit-maximizing, sharp-
witted entrepreneurs—whose valuation 
can change depending on expectations 
about the future. 
The goal of a well-behaved mon-
etary system, however, must be to 
achieve some efficiency goal, not price 
stability per se. Perhaps the most 
important result from my research is 
that a purely private monetary system 
does not provide the socially optimum 
quantity of money even in the best-
case scenario (i.e., in equilibrium with 
stable prices). Currency competition 
cannot provide an optimal outcome 
because, unlike the U.S. government, 
entrepreneurs do not mint additional 
tokens to account for the price effects 
they create for other participants in 
the market. Entrepreneurs just seek to 
maximize profits.10 The market will 
eventually fail to provide the right 
amount of money, whereas it does not 
fail to provide the right amount of 
other goods. This is expected from a 
theoretical standpoint, and my results 
confirm this intuition.
It may help to take a closer look 
at why this happens. Markets work 
well without frictions, but money only 
exists because of frictions. Specifi-
cally, money’s sole purpose is to solve 
the problem of transaction frictions. 
Money is not worth anything in itself, 
unlike wheat, bananas, and Netflix, 
which are valued for what they are. 
Markets do well supplying the opti-
mal amount of wheat and bananas 
and Netflix because consumers can 
substitute other goods in each of these 
instances, if desired. The very reason 
that money exists, however, is to pro-
vide liquidity service—something for 
which there is no (practical) substitute. 
This service is not properly rewarded in 
the market, and the issuers of money 
do not receive the commensurate ben-
efits for offering liquidity. This is true 
whether the money is privately-issued 
or government-issued. But unlike 
government-issued money, which has 
fiscal backing, entrepreneurs issuing 
private money will never internalize 
the cost of providing more liquid-
ity when it is not in their interest. To 
paraphrase Milton Friedman: markets 
can solve most problems, just not the 
problem of money.  And in part for 
that reason, cryptocurrency competi-
tion cannot be the monetary cure-all 
that some proponents have envisioned.
sunspot equilibria in ’genuinely dynamic, fundamentally 
disaggregative’ models of money,” Journal of Economic 
Theory, 109(2), 156–171. 
 10  The price effects generated by a producer or a consumer 
on third parties when they decide to produce or consume 
more of something are known by economists as pecuniary 
externalities. As we will explain below, in markets without 
frictions, pecuniary externalities are of the “right size,” 
as they induce the correct behavior by producers and 
consumers. Thus, entrepreneurs seeking only to maximize 
profits produce the “correct” amount of their good. In mar-
kets with frictions, pecuniary externalities have the “wrong 
size” and entrepreneurs do not deliver the socially optimal 
amount of the good they produce.
 11  The money-growth rule proposes that a central bank 
increase the money supply every year at a constant rate, 
regardless of macroeconomic conditions.
 12  Vincenzo Villamena, “Everything you need to know about 
Bitcoin and your taxes,” CNBC, February 21, 2018.
 13  See U.S. vs. Coinbase, Inc. (“Based upon an IRS search, 
only 800 to 900 persons electronically filed a Form 8949 
that included a property description that is “likely related to 
bitcoin” in each of the years 2013 through 2015.”)
 14  Anthony Peyton, “Australia’s new payments platform 
launches,” BankingTech.com, February 13, 2018. 
NOTES 
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TAKEAWAYS FOR 
POLICYMAKERS
As an alternative means of exchange, 
it is reasonable to expect that cryp-
tocurrencies might have an effect on 
government monetary policy. Con-
sider the case where the government 
follows a rather standard money-
growth rule.11 Under this policy, 
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will 
frustrate the government’s attempt to 
implement a positive real return on 
money through deflation when the 
public is willing to hold private cur-
rencies. There are, fortunately, alterna-
tive policies that can simultaneously 
promote stability and efficiency. For 
example, the government may peg 
the real value of its money. Under this 
rule, the government can implement 
an efficient allocation (i.e., supply the 
amount of money that maximizes 
social welfare) as the unique equilib-
rium outcome, but this would require 
driving all private money out of the 
economy. That is an unlikely scenario 
for the U.S.
There is, however, an important 
lesson here: the threat of competition 
from private monies imposes some 
market discipline on any govern-
ment involved in issuing currency. If 
a central bank, for example, does not 
provide sufficiently “good” money, 
then it will have difficulties in the 
implementation of its desired alloca-
tions. This may be the best feature of 
cryptocurrencies. In a world where 
individuals can switch to Bitcoin 
or Ethereum, central banks need to 
provide, paraphrasing Adam Smith, a 
tolerable administration of money. On 
this front, at least, currency compe-
tition may have a large upside for 
human welfare.
In the United States, there is 
nothing that government policy-
makers should do to curb the use of 
cryptocurrencies at the moment. They 
do not challenge the dollar and should 
be allowed to operate freely, although 
U.S. regulators may want to consider 
(more thoroughly) their responses 
to issues raised by the existence of 
cryptocurrencies. For instance, the IRS 
currently treats decentralized curren-
cies like Bitcoin as property and not 
as regular currency.12 It may be more 
accurate to tax cryptocurrencies like 
other currencies. Taxable gains from 
the growth in cryptocurrencies have 
been drastically underreported over 
the past few years, so some measure 
may likely need to be taken to facili-
tate compliance.13 Additionally, any 
steps that can be taken to ensure that 
these private monies are not used for 
criminal activity should be evaluated. 
Otherwise, cryptocurrencies them-
selves pose no threat to U.S. monetary 
policy operations.
Cryptocurrency technology, 
however, does bring to the fore a 
problem that will require serious 
efforts from federal policymakers to 
address adequately, and that is the 
problem of the United States’ inef-
ficient, costly (to users), and outdated 
payment system. Today, it typically 
takes 3-4 days to transfer money from 
one U.S. bank account to another, 
even though the sending account is 
often debited immediately. Given 
the current level of technology in the 
world, this process should require 
mere minutes. Nowhere is this reality 
better exemplified than in Australia, 
which earlier this year rolled out its 
New Payments Platform (NPP). The 
NPP enables customers with accounts 
at different banking institutions “to 
make payments to each other any time 
of day, any day of the year.” Moreover, 
the NPP uses an updated messaging 
standard to improve data processing 
and it “provides real-time settlement 
via the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 
Fast Settlement Service.”14 This 
modern payments system is the result 
of six years of work, following the 
release of a strategic report on Austra-
lia’s previous system. There are fewer 
bureaucratic and financial barriers in 
Australia, but the creation of the NPP 
gives an idea of how much lead-time 
is required to modernize a country’s 
payments system.
The technology associated with 
cryptocurrencies is a proof of concept 
for payment processing. Bitcoin can 
typically be transferred in about an 
hour. This sends the clear message that 
the U.S. payment system is outdated 
and could be much better. Revamping 
the entire payment system is a com-
plex project that would require coop-
eration from many actors, including 
the Treasury Department, the Federal 
Reserve, and most private deposit-
taking institutions. This transition will 
eventually be unavoidable, particularly 
as other countries continue to improve 
their own systems—and especially if 
the markets for cryptocurrencies con-
tinue their rapid growth—so serious 
efforts should begin now.
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